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The wars of this era are being fought by and against non-state actors (NSAs). NSAs 
typically include terrorist organizations, rebels and mercenaries, acting outside the law in 
the territory of a sovereign territorial state. Whereas states are constrained by the 
guidelines and regulations of international humanitarian law (IHL), the activities of NSAs 
seemingly remain unregulated by IHL; their use of force is prohibited by the laws of the 
states where they operate, as well as by the international laws of using force. These NSAs 
use all sorts of unlawful means of war, constantly targeting civilians with unlawful 
weapons and making violent statements by bombing schools, religious places and hospitals 
for political motives. Despite these heinous acts being carried out by NSAs, they are not 
being held responsible for any of these activities. These NSAs desire power, state control 
and money. They are not only backed by sponsoring regimes for political reasons, but are 
also awarded monetary and weaponry aid by some states. The result is that civilians are 
the ones most affected by the use of force by NSAs. This paper will discuss the applicability 
of IHL to NSAs by exploring its provisions applicable to NSAs and its associated aspects. 
The paper will also discuss the alternative law of agreeing with NSAs for compliance with 
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The use of force in this era – be it in the international war on terror1 or in the 
domestic use of force in internal conflicts during civil wars2 – is used by and against 
NSAs.3 In these conflicts, it is often civilians that face the horrors of war.4 The concept of 
IHL exists primarily to decrease human suffering during war5 and to protect precious 
human lives.6 It is considered a set of state-centric rules that bind only governments to 
abide by the laws of human protection.7 These state-centric rules are usually inapplicable 
against NSAs resulting in the world realizing that the applicability of IHL to NSAs is vitally 
important.8 These NSAs include anarchists and unlawful terrorists,9 rebels and warlords,10 
                                                        
1 See BELINDA HELMKE, UNDER ATTACK: CHALLENGES TO THE RULES GOVERNING THE 
INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE 167 (2013). 
2 STEPHEN L. QUACKENBUSH, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: LOGIC AND EVIDENCE 35 (2014). 
3 See HELMKE, supra note 1; see also Id. 
4 See Daniel Rothbart, Karina V. Korostelina & Mohammed Cherkaoui, The Place and Plight of 
Civilians in Modern War, in CIVILIANS AND MODERN WAR: ARMED CONFLICT AND THE 
IDEOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 1 (Daniel Rothbart et. al. eds., 2012); see also Karina V. Korostelina, 
Devastating Civilians at Home, in CIVILIANS AND MODERN WAR: ARMED CONFLICT AND THE 
IDEOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 51 (Daniel Rothbart et. al. eds., 2012); see also Alexander B. Downes, 
Military Culture and Civilian Victimization, in CIVILIANS AND MODERN WAR: ARMED CONFLICT 
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 72 (Daniel Rothbart et. al. eds., 2012). 
5 EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 177 (2016). 
6 UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE, UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN AFRICA 
163 (Christof H. Heyns & Karen Stefiszyn eds., 2006). 
7 Ida Gjerdrum Haugen, Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law: A Study on 
Parallel Legal Agreements, Armed Groups and Compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law University of Oslo, 26 (Nov. 10, 2011). 
8 Dayana Jadarian, International Humanitarian Law’s Applicability to Armed Non-State Actors 8 
(Fall 2007) (unpublished graduate paper, University of Stockholm) (available at 
http://www.juridicum.su.se/juruppsatser/2008/ht_2008_Dayana_Jadarian.pdf). 
9 Noemi Gal-Or, Observations on the Desirability of an Enhanced International Legal Status of 
the Non-State Actor, in NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM LAW-
TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS 141 (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2016). 
10 Caroline Varin, Introduction, in VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA: TERRORISTS, 
REBELS AND WARLORDS 5 (Caroline Varin & Dauda Abubakar eds., 2017). 
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who bow to no rules11 and exercise illegitimate violence.12 Since the methods used by 
NSAs severely affect civilians during armed conflicts, legal theorists are trying to bind 
NSAs with IHL rules and principles to protect civilians by coming up with and applying 
alternative laws (laws exclusively binding NSAs) or customary international laws (that are 
universally applicable) to reduce human suffering. 13  There have been a number of 
legitimate concerns about applying alternative IHL to NSAs through the use of agreements, 
such as the concern of providing NSAs with the legitimacy to use force, because without 
such agreements14 all use of force by NSAs is considered illegitimate.15 However, making 
agreements with NSAs requires admitting NSAs’ legitimate authority and thus their 
authority to use force.16 As a result, theorists are stuck with the dilemma of balancing the 
reduction of human suffering and the legitimization of NSAs’ authority and their use of 
force. Accordingly, this paper seeks to explore this dilemma in detail by analysing the 
applicability of IHL to NSAs, while discussing its concerns and challenges. Moreover, this 
paper will try to summarize the legality of the current legal framework in its efforts to 
reduce human suffering and applying IHL to NSAs. It will also try to come up with a 
neutral avenue to compel NSAs to reduce human suffering without legitimizing their use 
of force. 
Accordingly, this paper has three sections. Section 1 will describe and define NSAs 
by outlining their characteristics and types. Afterwards, Section 2 will discuss the 
applicability of IHL to NSAs by exploring the applicable provisions of IHL and discussing 
the associated aspects of the application of IHL to NSAs. Thereafter, Section 3 will discuss 
agreeing alternative laws with NSAs for the compliance and enforcement of IHL, while 
discussing its pitfalls in the shape of the legitimacy concern. 
                                                        
11 Gal-Or, supra note 9, at 125, 141. 
12 Varin, supra note 10. 
13 Andrew Clapham, The Right and Responsibilities of Armed Non-State Actors: The Legal 
Landscape & Issues Surrounding Engagement (Feb. 2010). See also Haugen, supra note 7. 
14 Dawn Steinhoff, Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engaging Non-State 
Armed Groups, 45 TEX. INT’L L. J. 297, 309-310 (2011). 
15 Varin, supra note 10. 
16 Steinhoff, supra note 14, at 318, 320. 
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1. Non-State Actors (NSA) 
Only a state can use legitimate force in its territory.17 NSAs therefore use unlawful 
force within a sovereign state’s territory without authorization18 in order to meet private 
ends, such as to assume power, acquire property19, collect money,20 and also for covert 
civic, political and economic reasons.21 Usually NSAs are wanted outlaws, such as rebel 
groups, terrorist groups, mercenaries, and drug/warlords,22 who fight against their own 
state.23 24 As a result, the state fights back and uses legitimate force against NSAs.25 
However, for political reasons, these NSAs are also used by other states and paid as 
mercenaries, receiving aid in terms of modern war weaponry, funds and training.26 They 
are also backed by these states to fight proxy wars on their behalf.27 However, it is pertinent 
to mention here that, in accordance with the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, arming and abetting 
NSAs in another territorial state violates the international law of using force, with such 
arming and abetting is even considered an act of aggression.28 Moreover, NSAs use all 
                                                        
17 JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A NATURAL LAW THEORY OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 306 
(John Witte Jr. ed., 2010). 
18 Varin, supra note 10. 
19 Anki Sjöberg & Elisabeth D. Warner, Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future 
Challenges 9 (Democratic Control of Armed Forces Horizon, Working Paper No. 5, 2015), 
https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/ANSA_Final.pdf. 
20 GOERAN B. JOHANSSON, A SLAVIC PEOPLE. A RUSSIAN SUPERPOWER. A CHARISMATIC 
WORLD LEADER. THE GLOBAL UPHEAVAL. TRILOGY 328 (Gillian Beal ed., Ahad Ghorbani 
Dehnari trans., 2013). 
21 NATASHA EZROW, GLOBAL POLITICS AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS 31 (2017). 
22 Varin, supra note 10. 
23 Id. 
24 JOHANSSON, supra note 20; See also Ezrow, supra note 21, at 31. 
25 See Michael Miklaucic, Contending with Illicit Power Structures, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS 
STANDARD SETTERS 199 (Anne Peters et. al. eds., 2009). 
26 LUIZ ALBERTO MONIZ BANDEIRA, THE SECOND COLD WAR: GEOPOLITICS AND THE 
STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF THE USA 246 (Americo Lucena Lage trans., Springer Int’l Pub. 
2017). 
27 Id. at 291-95. 
28 MAX HILAIRE, NIJHOFF LAW SPECIALS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED STATES 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 101 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. ed., 1997). 
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sorts of unorthodox weapons and techniques in armed combat, because they are outlaws 
and do not bow to any rules or regulations. For example, terrorists use suicide vests to blow 
themselves up as a means of using force and causing terror and fear.29 Similarly, rebels in 
Syria have used chemical weapons against civilians, which is outlawed.30 The UN defines 
an NSA as a group of people that has “the potential to employ arms in the use of force to 
achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; [but] are not within the military 
structures of states, state-alliances or intergovernmental organizations; and are not under 
the control of the state(s) in which they operate”.31  
1.1. Characteristics of NSAs 
NSAs are involved in the continual use of force or armed activities resulting in 
losing their categorization as civilians under IHL.32 However, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross has noted that, though NSAs are considered combatants, they cannot 
enjoy the legal privileges that are ascribed to state combatants.33 The most influential NSAs 
are those that openly control larger territories in a state, compared to weaker NSAs that 
work clandestinely, because NSAs aspire to gain power, land and to undermine state 
control.34 Their control can be both transnational and affect civilians in several countries. 
This is the case for terrorist organizations such as: the “Moro Islamic Liberation Front”, 
which controls territory in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Nepal; the Lord’s 
Resistance Army which controls territory in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and Sudan; 35  and Al-Qaeda which controls territory in Syria, Yemen and Somalia.36 
                                                        
29 AMI PEDAHZUR, SUICIDE TERRORISM 182-83 (2005). 
30 UN’s Del Ponte says evidence Syria rebels ‘used sarin,’ BBC NEWS: MIDDLE EAST (May 6, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22424188. 
31 FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNJER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW 439 (Laura 
Brav & Camille Michel eds. & trans., 3d ed. 2013). See also Tim Rutherford, Everyone’s 
Accountable: How Non-State Armed Groups Interact with International Humanitarian Law, 198 
Austl. Def. Force J. 76, 77 (2015). 
32 Rutherford, supra note 31. 
33 Id. 
34 Sjöberg & Warner, supra note 19. 
35 Id. 
36 DONALD HOLBROOK, AL-QAEDA 2.0: A CRITICAL READER 101 (2018). 
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Usually, these NSAs are funded by foreign aid, which includes monetary aid, weapons and 
transportation. For instance, the US, the UK and France provide arms and aid to rebels in 
Syria to fight for their cause and defend their political interests in the region.37 (Maybe a 
conclusion sentence to wrap up this section).   
1.2. Types of NSA 
NSA rebel groups are groups of people that undertake sporadic and organized acts 
of violence against a legitimate state.38 They can be either organized or disorganized, and 
control or not control parts of any territory.39 Rebels have no rights, as they use unlawful 
force against the state and civilians;40 they are legally bound by the domestic laws of force 
and are considered wanted criminals.41 Rebels often are supported financially through 
foreign funds (gained for political reasons) and by fighting as mercenaries. For instance, 
Syrian rebels are funded by the US, the UK and France.42 Mercenaries are lawless armed 
groups that fight proxy wars for money and power against their own countries as well as 
in cross-border conflicts.43 Rebels and mercenaries also start and fight civil/guerrilla wars 
as well in order  to destabilize countries.44 Such destabilizations give territory, control and 
power to armed bands of rebels, mercenaries and terrorists.45 Terrorists are also NSAs, 
                                                        
37 BANDEIRA, supra note 26, at 246, 291-95. 
38 Jadarian, supra note 8, at 12. 
39 Sjöberg & Warner, supra note 19, at 8-9. 
40 Varin, supra note 10. 
41 Jadarian, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
42 BANDEIRA, supra note 26, at 246, 291-95. 
43 Id. at 291-95. 
44 See David E. Cunningham, et. al., Non-State Actors in Civil Wars, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 
2016 50 (David Backer et. al. eds., 2016). See also Guerillas, in IBERIA AND THE AMERICAS: 
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND HISTORY 531 (John Michael Francis ed., 2006) (explaining the context 
of guerilla warfare to destabilize states). 
45 See Ibrahim Mazlum, ISIS as an Actor Controlling Water Resources in Syria and Iraq, in 
VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 109-128 (Özden Oktav et. al. eds., 
2017) (explaining how ISIS gained control in Syria). See also Maria Gloria Polimeno, Fury and 
Soldiery of Non-God: ISIS’s Psycho-Structural Dysfunctions and the Future of Counter-
Terrorism, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL DISINTEGRATION IN THE POST-ARAB 
SPRING MIDDLE EAST (Imad H. El-Anis & Natasha Underhill eds., 2016) (discussing ISIS 
control). See also Alia Chughtai, Syria’s war: Who controls what?, AL JAZEERA (May 10, 2018), 
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using unlawful force against states and civilians for political, power and religious reasons.46 
Because terrorists are considered NSAs, 47  and because most of the rebel 
groups/mercenaries in this age are considered terrorists who commit heinous war crimes,48, 
this paper uses “terrorists” and “NSAs” interchangeably. 
2. Applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
The applicability of IHL to NSAs is widely controversial. There are three prominent 
theories for how IHL is already applicable to NSAs.  However, it is apparent that NSAs 
choose to ignore it. For instance, terrorist organizations break laws and rules during their 
acts of terrorism, such as bombing innocent children in schools.49 The first argument is 
that, like all non-party states, NSAs are bound by customary international law, including 
the principles of distinction, proportionality, precaution and necessity and the prohibition 
on indiscriminate attacks.50 By this argument, even if NSAs have not agreed to or have 
signed a treaty, they are still bound by IHL, since IHL also acts as customary international 
law.51 This argument is backed by the inclusion of NSAs in common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions (GC) and its self-explanatory declaration that customary international 
humanitarian law is applicable to NSAs.52 This group goes so far as to assert that, since 
                                                        
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-
150529144229467.html?xif=. (discussing rebel-controlled territory in Syria). 
46 Varin, supra note 10, at 5, 15. 
47 Id. 
48 HYERAN JO, COMPLIANT REBELS 11 (2015). See also DANIEL BYMAN, UNDERSTANDING 
PROTO-INSURGENCIES 1(2007). 
49 See KEVIN BURTON, MANAGING EMERGING RISK: THE CAPSTONE OF PREPAREDNESS 142 
(2016) (illustrating how terrorists bomb children in schools). 
50 Tatiana Londono-Camargo, The Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law to 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 130 VNIVERSITAS 207, 223 (2015). 
51 Id. at 225. See also Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen International law 
and armed non-state actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 1, 9 (2011).  
52 See Chris De Cock, Counter-Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan, 13 Y.B. INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 97, 109 (2010). See also Bellal et al., supra note 51, at 55. 
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IHL is universal in nature and seeks to ensure the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
everyone – including NSAs – is bound by its rules.53 
The second argument is that, owing to the applicability of all domestic laws to 
NSAs, NSAs are bound by all of IHL through its inclusion in legislation/domestic law.54 
The third argument is that IHL is applicable to NSAs since they are bound by all the legal 
responsibilities and obligations of the state where they are operating. 55  The argument 
continues that all the IHL obligations that bind a state also bind all NSAs and individuals 
within the territories of that state.56 This argument is known as the “principle of legislative 
jurisdiction”, by which NSAs are automatically bound by all state obligations.57 This claim 
is even substantiated by common Article 3, which makes NSAs also responsible for IHL 
rules and regulations.58 Noticeably, the United Nations Security Council is also of the view 
that NSAs are bound by IHL in internal armed conflicts.59 While NSAs cannot legally 
become parties to treaties, and cannot contribute to creating customary international law, 
the prevailing view is that IHL is applicable to NSAs.60  For these reasons, it can be 
established that all kinds of NSAs are already bound by IHL.61 
                                                        
53 Bellal et al., supra note 51, at 55. 
54 Id. 
55 CLAUDIE BARRAT, STATUS OF NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 232 (2014). 
See also Bellal et al., supra note 51, at 56. 
56 Cedric Ryngaert, Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law 5 (2008) (unpublished 
working paper) (on file with the Inst. for Int’l Law). 
57 Id. 
58 See Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. 
59 Londoño-Camargo, supra note 51, at 224. 
60 Haugen, supra note 7, at 26. 
61 Londono-Camargo, supra note 50. 
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2.1. Provisions of Applicable Law 
NSAs are explicitly mentioned under the IHL provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions,62 its additional protocol63 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.64 
2.1.1. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (GC) 
For some commentators and legal theorists, common Article 3 is applicable only to 
parties to a conflict that are under state control.65 Others believe that NSAs (which are not 
under state control) are also covered under the same Article only for civilian immunity.66 
Scholars seeking to apply IHL to NSAs often substantiate their stance by questioning why 
only the state must follow IHL, whereas NSAs use force free from any legal liabilities and 
rules.67 Thereby, it gives NSAs an advantage over governments, whose acts and strengths 
are limited by the rules of IHL, while NSAs execute their plans without any fear of 
responsibilities. 
Common Article 3 reads: 
ARTICLE 3 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall 
be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de 
combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
                                                        
62 See Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
63 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art.1, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
64 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 94-98 
[hereinafter Rome Statute 2002]. 
65 Bellal, et al., supra note 51, at 7. 
66 Id. 
67 Dayana Jadarian, International Humanitarian Law’s Applicability to Armed Non-State Actors, 
Univ. of Stockholm, (2007). 
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prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the 
above-mentioned persons: 
a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
b) Taking of hostages; 
c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial 
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the 
conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status 
of the Parties to the conflict.68 
The first requirement in this Article is that there must be a non-international armed 
conflict for the Article to apply, and one party to that conflict must be a state.69 This means 
that this Article applies only to internal conflicts and not to international conflicts. 70 
Scholars argue that the other party must be non-state, such as an NSA.  Over the years, 
case law, customary law and state practices have established that common Article 3 does 
indeed apply to NSAs.71 In accordance with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, there must be two characteristics for the application of IHL to an 
NSA.72 The first is that the duration of the armed conflict must be sufficiently long. The 
second is that the NSA must be organized.73 For instance, the fight against Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan has been going on for a long time, and Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization 
certainly shows the signs of an organized group. Therefore, Article 3 is applicable to the 
                                                        
68 See Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
69 Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 35-36 (2002). See also Common Article 3, 
supra note 59. 
70 See Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
71 Bellal, et al., supra note 51. 
72 See Tamas Hoffman, Trying Communism through International Criminal Law in THE 
HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS (2013). See also Bellal, et al., supra note 51. 
73 See Tamas Hoffman, supra note 72. See also Bellal, et al., supra note 51. 
14 
 
armed conflict between Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda.74 However, Article 3 does not require 
any prerequisites for the application of IHL; it is simply applicable to all NSAs. 
Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that this Article in no way decreases the state’s right to 
put down these rebels or terrorists.75 
2.1.2. Additional Protocol II to the GC 
Similar to common Article 3,76 Additional Protocol II (AP II) also discusses the 
applicability of IHL to NSAs.77 Article 1, paragraph 1, of AP II reads: 
[T]o all armed conflicts … which takes places in the territory of a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.78 
In comparison to common Article 3,79 Article 1 of AP II raises the threshold of 
applicability of IHL to NSAs. The NSA must reflect all four characteristics outlined 
under Article 1 of AP II. First, the NSA must have system of “responsible command” 
for allocating responsibility,80 such as the Taliban’s “Code of Conduct”.81 Second, the 
NSA must control a significant territory. Third, the NSA must have sustained 
continuous armed attacks on the state. Fourth, the NSA must be able to implement the 
protocol.82 Scholars have argued that such state-like characteristics, together with the 
requisite of implementing the protocol, makes it apparent that the protocol is only 
applicable to the parties already implementing it.83 
                                                        
74 Bellal, et al., supra note 51. 
75 Londono-Camargo, supra note 50. 
76 See Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
77 Protocol II, supra note 63. 
78 Id. 
79 Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
80 Protocol II, supra note 63. 
81 Bellal et. al., supra note 51, at 11. 
82 Protocol II, supra note 63. 
83 Bellal et. al., supra note 51, at 12. 
15 
 
2.1.3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (RSICC) 
Similar to common Article 3 of GC84 and Article 1 of AP II to the GC,85 Article 8 
(e) and (f) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (RSICC) applies IHL to 
NSAs.86 Article 8 (f) reads: 
Article 8 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus 
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies 
to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a state when there is 
protracted armed conflict between government authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups.87 
In a similar way to common Article 3,88 Article 8 of the RSICC also applies to 
internal conflicts within a state.89 The threshold of applying IHL to NSAs is higher than 
that of common Article 390 but lower than that of Article 1 of AP II.91 This Article sets out 
four main prerequisites for the application of IHL to NSAs. First, the armed conflict must 
be non-international. Second, the conflict must be protracted and not sporadic. Third, the 
NSA must be organized. Fourth, the conflict must be between a state and an NSA, or 
between one NSA and another (even without involving the state).92 Moreover, Article 8 (e) 
outlines IHL. It states that “civilians, transpiration vehicles, buildings, religious places, 
wounded people and property cannot be targeted in an armed conflict”, while prohibiting 
the use of “slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, rape, sexual violence, 
                                                        
84Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
85 Protocol II, supra note 63. 
86 Kristen E. Boon, The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in 
JUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 263 (Carsten Stahn et. al. eds., 
2014). See also Rome Statute 2002, supra note 64. 
87 Rome Statute 2002, supra note 64. 
88 Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
89 Boon, The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in JUS POST 
BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS, supra note 87. 
90 Common Article 3, supra note 58. 
91 Protocol II, supra note 63. 
92 Rome Statute 2002, supra note 64. 
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displacement of civilians, poisoned weapons and underage combatants in the armed 
conflicts”.93 
2.2. Associated Aspects of the Application of IHL to the NSA 
This subsection will briefly explore the internal conflict and the responsibilities of 
NSAs as “contingent aspects” and “nature of conflict” in the context of the application of 
IHL to NSAs. 
2.2.1. Internal Conflict 
It is interesting to note that the relevant provisions apply IHL to NSAs only in internal 
conflicts (non-international armed conflicts). 94  However, globalization has mutated 
internal conflicts into international and transnational armed conflicts through the 
intervention of third-state parties that involve themselves to either support or stop one party 
that is involved with the conflict. 95  IHL specifically avoids considering NSAs in 
international conflicts for legal reasons,96 because states are forbidden from intervening in 
the internal matters of a state in accordance with the laws of the use of force, owing to the 
shield of sovereignty.97 The principle of non-interference is also enshrined in Article 2 (7) 
of the UN Charter.98 Article 2 (7) reads: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.99 
However, this does not mean that international conflicts involving NSAs remain 
unregulated by the rules and guidelines of IHL.100 On the contrary: if an armed conflict is 
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“international” in nature, IHL is applicable,101 as compared to internal conflicts, where only 
a few IHL laws apply.102 
2.2.3. Responsibility of NSAs 
The Appeals Chamber to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia established that NSAs’ officers in command carry command responsibility for 
war crimes committed by combatants fighting and using force under their command.103 
The Court noted that this principle of command responsibility is the most efficient way of 
bringing justice and enforcing criminal law to NSAs.104 The Court established this liability 
by reasoning that military organization requires responsible command, which implies 
accountability, including criminal accountability.105 Therefore, a commander can be held 
liable for prohibited acts committed by a combatant who they are responsible for.106 
Categorically, IHL is only triggered when there is an armed conflict and all the 
prerequisites of the application of IHL are fulfilled.107 Hence, if IHL applies to an NSA, 
there must be responsible command, because otherwise, IHL would not be applicable.108 
Therefore, in accordance with these rules, officers in command can be held criminally 
liable for the crimes of their subordinates and for failing to prevent such crimes.109 
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3. Alternative Law and Its Concerns 
Some legal theorists argue that IHL is not applicable to NSAs simply because NSAs 
have not consented to it.110 They propose that, to make NSA responsible in international 
law, it is first necessary to acquire their consent and agreement to the applicable IHL.111 
Therefore, advocates of creating alternative laws to bind NSAs by IHL  argue that states 
should sign agreements with NSAs to bind them to IHL and the rules of armed conflict as 
an alternative law to IHL.112 By contrast, this paper argues that IHL is already applicable 
to NSAs113 and that states do not need to come to agreement with NSAs, for four main 
reasons. First, NSAs are already subject to state rules,114 by which they are forbidden from 
using any force.115 Second, they are subject to the state obligations of IHL, where NSAs’ 
use of force also creates criminal responsibilities.116 Third, NSA are already obliged to 
follow IHL, because it is customary international law.117 Fourth, signing agreements with 
NSAs legitimizes the NSAs’/terrorists’ use of force,118 by agreeing that NSAs/terrorists 
can use force but their use of force must be executed in a particular fashion. Furthermore, 
the main issue with the argument that IHL is not applicable to NSAs is that it presupposes 
that if any individual or group of individuals choose to ignore the laws of the land or 
customary international law they can live freely without being subject to any regulations. 
This not only creates anarchical situations, where individuals can massacre civilians 
without any criminal responsibility or fear of persecution in a scenario of lawlessness, but 
also creates the prospect of licensing terrorists to conduct their heinous criminal activities. 
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Such attempts to circumvent legal obligations seem to support NSAs in the sovereign 
territory of other states for political reasons. This fear of legitimating terrorists by signing 
agreements with them is reflected in the views of several scholars and states.119 Many legal 
theorists believe that IHL is already applicable to NSAs,120 and coming to agreement with 
NSAs gives them a sense of legitimacy and treats them as state-like institutions, even 
providing NSAs with a seat at the international table and legitimizing NSAs/terrorists’ use 
of force.121 
3.1 Legitimacy Concern 
Despite the  possible benefits of applying IHL, states do not come to agreement 
with NSAs for the application of IHL for fear of legitimizing the NSAs’/terrorists’ use of 
force by state laws.122  If a state allows NSAs to use force in a certain manner prescribed 
by an agreement; this permits them to use force in the legally defined ways of IHL. States 
are of the view that there is already a defined set of laws, which is state/domestic law,123 
according to which terrorists cannot use legal force against the state or the civilians.124 If 
the states come to agreement with terrorists regarding the rules of engagement through 
IHL, this would mean that NSAs can legally use force against the state, and that the state 
recognizes terrorists as users of legitimate force which grants NSAs a place to negotiate at 
the international table.125 Such legal status enjoyed by NSAs/terrorists would make it more 
difficult for states to fight terrorism against organizations with a façade of political 
legitimacy,126 which would grant terrorists immunity from being prosecuted for a number 
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of kinds of activities.127 For the same reason of not granting terrorists/NSAs positions equal 
to states, states do not acknowledge the legitimacy of agreements between NSAs and 
humanitarian aid groups.128 
Moreover, according to the international law of using force, internal conflicts or 
matters of state are the concern of the state alone, and other states cannot interfere.129 
According to ICJ case law, state X cannot arm or fund an NSA/rebel/terrorist organization 
in state Y.130 A conflict remains an internal matter even if state Y accepts the help of state 
Z (or a group of states) to fight the NSAs/rebels/terrorists in its territories.131 However, it 
would not remain an internal matter if the NSA is backed by state X.132 If state X interferes 
in the internal matters of state Y, then, legally speaking, state X is declaring war against 
state Y, which is considered to be an act of aggression.133 Therefore, in accordance with 
the law, the NSA cannot use any force, whether against the state or civilians; all kinds of 
use of force by the NSA are impermissible.134 A host state where the NSA resides or 
operates can use lawful force against the NSA. 135  However, no state can back 
NSAs/terrorists in the territory of another state,136 which would be considered an act of 
aggression.137 
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A state is responsible for bringing criminals to justice in its jurisdiction and it enjoys 
a monopoly of the use of force in its territory.138 But in internal armed conflicts where an 
NSA is responsible for violating international laws of armed conflict,139 who has authority 
to decide whether or not the NSA is violating IHL? Who can effectively prosecute 
violators?140 The International Criminal Court could be seen as the most competent body 
to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, such as NSAs, terrorists, and rebels, owing to its 
universal jurisdiction.141 However, there is no mechanism to formulate the execution of 
this court in this context.142 Therefore, there is an apparent lack of enforcement in the 
current international judicial system to the application of IHL to NSAs.143 Nevertheless, if 
the whole presumption of applying IHL to NSAs is based on the pretext that the state is 
incapable of bringing NSAs to justice, then the most reasonable way to curtail 
NSAs’/terrorists’ illicit activities is by aiding and supporting the territorial state to fight 
them, and not the other way around, that is, by aiding or abetting an NSA. For instance, the 
on-going wars in the Middle East that have escalated to the decade-long destruction of 
numerous countries is attributable to the fact that a number of states chose to support NSAs, 
terrorists, and or rebels144 who use unlawful force145. Owing to such support, the territorial 
states are incapable of fighting these terrorists/NSAs. Therefore, if the whole purpose of 
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applying IHL to NSAs is to decrease human suffering and enforce lawful regulations,146 
then states must choose to support the territorial states in their fight against NSAs, rather 
than supporting the NSAs/rebels. Moreover, to deter support for terrorists, the ICJ must 
prosecute states supporting NSAs/rebels/terrorists, while the territorial state must be 
supported by other states in fighting and prosecuting NSAs. Only in this way can IHL be 
effectively implemented and enforced and lawfulness be restored. If we were to apply this 
analysis in the Syrian case, then all support to the Syrian rebels/NSAs/terrorists must be 
halted and their supporters prosecuted, because such support destabilizes the region and 
makes IHL enforcement even harder. The Syrian state must be supported in fighting all 
kinds of NSA. 
In conclusion, this paper establishes that IHL is already applicable to NSA147 and 
that states do not need to come to agreement with NSAs, for four main reasons. First, NSAs 
are already subject to state rules148 not to use force.149 Second, they are subject to the state 
obligations of IHL, and NSAs’ use of force also creates criminal responsibility.150 Third, 
NSAs are already subject to IHL, because IHL is customary international law.151 Fourth, 
by signing agreements with NSA that legitimize their use of force,152 the state basically 
agrees that NSAs/terrorists can use force, but only in a particular fashion, where targeting 
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